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Abstract:  
We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine the impact of changes in managerial 
fiduciary duties on firms’ accounting and contracting choices. The ruling expanded directors’ fiduciary 
duties in favor of creditors and away from shareholders for a specific group of firms. Using a hand-collected 
sample of debt contracts around the ruling date, we find that, following the ruling, debt contracts of affected 
firms rely less on the use of income escalators (provisions in loan contracts which require changes in net 
worth to reflect losses in full, but only partially for gains and profits) and other conservative adjustments 
such as requiring net worth calculations to include extraordinary losses but not gains. In addition, affected 
firms exhibit lower abnormal accruals, greater magnitude and incidence of negative special items, and are 
more likely to adopt SFAS 106 using the immediate recognition method for OPEB liabilities. Our results 
hold across a battery of robustness tests. Overall, our study demonstrates how a shift in fiduciaries duties 
owed by management that enhances the relative power of creditors changes the nature of both financial 
reporting and debt contracting. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine how changes in managerial fiduciary duties impact accounting practices, both 
in GAAP-mandated financial statements (“accounting choices”) and in negotiated contracts 
between lenders and borrowers (“contracting choices”). Fiduciary duties impose obligations and 
restrictions on the conduct of officers and directors and are crucial to our understanding of 
corporate governance practices. 
We exploit an influential 1991 legal ruling by the Delaware Court of Chancery in the Credit 
Lyonnais v. Pathé Communications case, which was widely viewed as having shifted the balance 
of power in favor of creditors.1 This exogenous change in fiduciary duties constitutes a powerful 
natural experiment to examine firms’ accounting and contracting choices in the context of debt-
equity agency conflicts. Since the ruling only applied to Delaware (DE)-incorporated firms in the 
vicinity of insolvency, it enables us to employ a difference-in-difference identification strategy 
and compare affected and unaffected firms before and after 1991. 
Starting with Basu (1997), an extensive stream of accounting literature has examined 
conservatism in financial reporting. Watts (2003) proposes that lenders’ demand for conservatively 
reported accounting numbers is an important driver for the prevalence of conservatism in financial 
reporting observed in practice. Our setting allows us to examine accounting conservatism from the 
perspective of both preparers and users of accounting numbers. We propose a comprehensive view 
of the impact of the Credit Lyonnais ruling on both detailed accounting choices from managers (a 
preparer perspective) and the role of conservative financial reporting demanded in debt contracts 
                                                            
1 Before the 1991 Credit Lyonnais case, the prevailing view on managerial fiduciary duties was that officers and 
directors of solvent corporations owed fiduciary duties to shareholders but not to creditors. If the firm became 
insolvent, the fiduciary duties would extend to corporate creditors, who could then sue for breach of fiduciary duties 
if the officers and directors did not act in their interest. The 1991 Credit Lyonnais ruling changed this by explicitly 
requiring directors to act in creditors’ interests even if the firm is solvent but is in the “vicinity of insolvency”. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376476 
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(a user perspective). Thus, we shed further light on the largely unresolved question in the literature 
as to whether contractually negotiated conservative metrics in loan contracts can satisfy lenders’ 
demand for conservatism (either in addition to, or instead of, reliance on GAAP conservatism) 
(e.g., Schipper 2005; Guay and Verrecchia 2006). 
Prior research shows that, after the Credit Lyonnais ruling, affected firms exhibit an 
increase in GAAP conservatism (Aier et al. 2014). The notion of GAAP conservatism examined 
in Aier et al.’s setting involves general composite measures consisting of decile rankings of firm-
year observations based on averages of three conservatism proxies (negative non-operating 
accruals, skewness of earnings versus cash flows, and unrecorded balance sheet reserves). Such 
composite measures, while useful to capture overall degrees of accounting conservatism, do not 
address the mechanisms through which the increased reporting conservatism is achieved, and it is 
very difficult to translate such composite measures into what firms actually do. Moreover, while 
reporting financial outcomes is one response to a change in fiduciary duty, it is also possible that 
the underlying contracts themselves change.  
To explore this latter possibility, we hand-collect 261 credit agreements around the Credit 
Lyonnais ruling period along with the borrowers’ financial statement information. We then explore 
changes in: (1) contracting choices between borrowers and lenders as revealed by debt contract 
features, and (2) accounting choices by borrowers in their GAAP financial statements.  
First, we investigate whether and how credit agreements make use of accounting numbers, 
which are modified from their GAAP values and thus reflect lenders’ required level of 
conservatism. We examine the use of income escalators (provisions in loan contracts which require 
changes in net worth to reflect losses in full, but only partially for gains and profits) and the use of 
contractual adjustments to GAAP numbers which result in greater conservatism (for example, 
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stipulating the exclusion of extraordinary gains but not extraordinary losses). Beatty, Weber and 
Yu (2008) document an increasing trend in the use of income escalators in debt contracts over the 
period 1994-2004. In our earlier sample period covering 1989-1994, we observe a similar trend. 
However, the rate of increase is significantly lower for Delaware firms in the zone of insolvency 
than for firms unaffected by the Credit Lyonnais ruling. This suggests that lenders to borrowing 
firms perceived to experience lower agency problems (i.e., firms affected by the Credit Lyonnais 
ruling) require lower covenant protection when entering into debt contracts. The use of 
conservative adjustments to GAAP numbers is also lower in affected firms compared to unaffected 
firms after the ruling. 
We then identify several areas of GAAP reporting in which affected firms changed their 
accounting choices, focusing in particular on abnormal accruals and on negative special items. 
Thus, we pierce the “black box” of several conservatism measures, such as Basu (1997) – which 
is often questioned on econometric grounds (Dietrich, Mueller and Riedl 1997; Patatoukas and 
Thomas 2011). In addition, the abnormal accruals models that we implement allow us to examine 
changes in accounting that are not driven by changes in firms’ investing behaviors following 
Credit Lyonnais (Becker and Strömberg 2012).2 
We focus initially on the accruals behavior and the booking of negative special items in 
our hand-collected sample of firms with loan contracts. This allows us to examine how accounting 
choices in those firms change before and after the ruling, in conjunction with their contracting 
choices. Since the accruals data are machine-readable for the time period examined, we also 
conduct the accounting choices tests on the entire Compustat/CRSP population to ensure that those 
                                                            
2 Becker and Strömberg (2012) document that firms affected by the Credit Lyonnais ruling (i.e., Delaware-
incorporated firms close to financial distress) issue more equity and make greater capital and R&D investments, and 
there is lower volatility in their accounting and market returns after the ruling was passed. 
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results apply to the entire population and are not specific to the particular subset of firms for which 
we have detailed credit agreements.3  
We conduct an additional set of tests regarding the recognition of liabilities for post-
retirement benefits other than pensions (OPEB) upon adoption of SFAS 106. The adoption of this 
standard occurred just after the Credit Lyonnais case, and patterns of differential adoption between 
affected and unaffected firms can help shed further light on the impact of a change in fiduciary 
duties on firms’ accounting choices. For the SFAS 106 tests, we consider all firms on 
Compustat/CRSP, because too few of the firms in our hand-collected sample were subject to the 
standard. 
We predict and find more negative discretionary operating accruals and more negative 
special items in affected firms after the ruling, indicating greater conservatism in the reported 
numbers. We also find more timely recognition of the OPEB liability in affected firms. The 
economic magnitudes of these changes are significant. The results provide insights into 
mechanisms supporting the debt contracting explanation for conservatism posited in Watts (2003). 
Our findings suggest that officers and directors, facing a greater duty of care and loyalty towards 
creditors, are more likely to report more conservative accounting numbers in the firm’s public 
filings, thus demonstrating that they are acting in creditors’ interest.  
When we interpret our results on contracting and accounting choices jointly, our evidence 
sheds light on both the preparer and user perspectives of conservative accounting. Our results 
suggest that, firstly, firms respond to an exogenous increase in fiduciary duties favoring creditors 
by reporting GAAP financial statements that are prepared more conservatively. From a user 
perspective, we find that the debt contracts of affected firms contain fewer conservative 
                                                            
3 We present the accounting choices results for the sample of firms with loan contracts in the main tables and for the 
entire Compustat/CRSP population in Appendix 3. 
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modifications to GAAP accounting numbers compared to unaffected firms. Since accounting 
choices relating to the preparation of GAAP numbers are made on a quarterly basis regardless of 
whether a firm has debt contracts or not, the likely sequence of choices is that borrowers’ 
accounting choices are first reflected in the GAAP accounting numbers, and contracting choices 
negotiated between borrowers and lenders are then made taking into account the properties of the 
GAAP numbers. Thus, we conclude that lenders’ needs are at least partially met by the more 
conservative accounting choices reflected in GAAP reports provided by borrowing firms since 
there is a reduced need for reliance on conservative modifications in loan contracts.  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
accounting conservatism literature by examining a supply side mechanism supporting the debt 
contracting explanation for conservatism posited in Watts (2003). Existing studies on this topic 
focus mainly on the demand side and provide evidence consistent with the conjecture that lenders 
demand accounting conservatism from borrowing firms (e.g., Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and 
Stanford-Harris 2002; Beatty et al. 2008; Nikolaev 2010; Tan 2013; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; 
Zhang 2008). However, since lenders’ demand for higher conservatism must be fulfilled by 
borrowers, it is important to understand the incentives and obligations faced by the borrowing 
firms since they are ultimately responsible for the preparation of financial reports. Furthermore, 
we provide insights about the specific mechanisms used by firms reporting more conservatively. 
These mechanisms include discretionary accruals, negative special items, and the recognition of 
potentially large and important liabilities such as OPEBs.  
Second, our paper contributes to the debate about whether contractually negotiated 
conservative features of debt contracts provide an adequate mechanism to satisfy lenders’ demand 
for conservatism. Our findings suggest that lenders do take into account the degree of accounting 
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conservatism provided by borrowing firms in their GAAP financial statements and these lenders 
adjust their use of contractually negotiated conservative adjustments accordingly. 
Third, our paper contributes to the literature on agency conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders, and the relative strength of the fiduciary duty that management owes to these parties. 
Building on the investing and financing angles studied by Becker and Strömberg (2012) and the 
initial accounting evidence in Aier et al. (2014), we examine the impact of changes in fiduciary 
duties on specific accounting and contracting choices. 
Finally, we contribute to the role of officers and directors on accounting practices and in 
particular on conservative reporting. Prior literature shows that accounting conservatism is 
associated with managerial ownership and board characteristics (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman 2007; 
LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; García Lara et al., 2009). We add to this literature by 
documenting the fiduciary duty channel, through which officers and directors influence the 
observed level of accounting conservatism. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the sources of data and research design and presents the results. Section 4 presents 
additional analyses and robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
Delaware court ruling: Credit Lyonnais vs. Pathé Communications 
 The Credit Lyonnais ruling was reached on December 30, 1991 and generated a great deal 
of press coverage and commentaries by legal experts. Prior to the case, the general understanding 
under Delaware law was that managers and directors did not owe fiduciary duties to creditors prior 
to insolvency. The significance of the Credit Lyonnais case is that it expanded the scope of 
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directors’ fiduciary duties to parties other than shareholders even before the corporation becomes 
insolvent.4 
 The case arose out of the leveraged buyout of MGM, which was primarily financed by 
Credit Lyonnais. The newly formed private company had immediate trouble meeting its financial 
obligations. Only five months after the acquisition, MGM secured an additional credit line of $145 
million from Credit Lyonnais. At the same time, Pathé Communications (MGM’s controlling 
shareholder) and Credit Lyonnais entered into a corporate governance agreement that permitted 
Credit Lyonnais to gain control through nomination of MGM directors. Credit Lyonnais exercised 
its rights under this agreement and appointed a new CEO and directors. 
 The corporate governance agreement also allowed Pathé to regain voting rights of the 
controlling shares of MGM and potentially remove bank-designated directors if the debt could be 
sufficiently paid down. In an attempt to do so, Pathé sought to sell MGM’s interest in an overseas 
subsidiary. MGM’s directors did not approve the sale, and Pathé sued claiming that the new 
management and directors were in breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to Pathé by favoring 
creditors’ interest. 
 In December 1991, the court ruled that the new management “was not disloyal in not 
immediately facilitating whatever asset sales were in the financial best interest of the controlling 
shareholders.” The court held that “the new management was appropriately mindful of the 
potential differing interests between the corporation and its controlling shareholder. At least where 
                                                            
4 Although technically the ruling referred to all stakeholders, the focus in subsequent discussions and studies by the 
press, legal scholars, lawyers, and other legal cases is almost always on creditors. For example, see Geyer vs. Ingersoll 
Publications 1992; Weaver vs. Kellogg 1997; and Medlin vs. Wells Fargo Bank 2007. For the text of the ruling, see 
Memorandum Opinion, Civ. A. No. 12150, Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County. For further 
institutional details surrounding the case, see Becker and Strömberg (2012).  
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a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent 
of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”5 
 The ruling came as a surprise to the business and legal community and immediately 
triggered widespread media coverage.6 The ruling generated considerable comments and 
controversy over the additional obligations and thus potential liability of boards of directors of 
firms that are solvent but in the “vicinity of insolvency.” 
 
Empirical predictions 
Changes in the use of loan contract modifications around Credit Lyonnais ruling 
 Conservatism in GAAP financial statements can serve the needs of lenders. For example, 
one common monitoring mechanism is to require that borrowers maintain financial covenants 
calculated using GAAP numbers.7 With net worth covenants, the asymmetric treatment of gains 
and losses under GAAP rules works in lenders’ favor because net worth covenant slack will be 
tightened if the borrower encounters adverse conditions. More conservative GAAP financial 
reporting would therefore make violation of net worth covenants more likely, thus providing an 
early warning sign to lenders about eventual non-recoverability of the loan amount and to grant 
them control rights which can help safeguard their capital (Zhang 2008; Tan 2013). 
                                                            
5 Footnote 55 of the ruling states that the possibility of insolvency can expose creditors to risks of opportunistic 
behavior if the fiduciary duties of directors are owed to shareholders only. It states that “in managing the business 
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right […] course to 
follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders […] would make if given the opportunity 
to act.” 
6 According to Becker and Strömberg (2012), 24 newspapers covered the case and ruling on the day of or day following 
the ruling and, in the three months after the court ruling, the Credit Lyonnais case was covered 62 times in the 
mainstream press and newswires. 
7 In our setting, the Delaware ruling is an exogenous shock that alters the system’s equilibrium. Thus, given the 
contracts in place at the time, to the extent that the supply of externally reported (i.e., GAAP) accounting numbers 
from managers changes in response to the exogenous event, we expect that new contracts will endogenously arise 
following Credit Lyonnais which will reflect changes in lenders’ demand for financial information following the 
ruling. 
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 Lenders can also protect themselves without having to rely on conservatively-prepared, 
general-purpose GAAP financial statements. They can require that borrowers follow accounting 
measurement rules which differ from GAAP rules (Leftwich 1983; Schipper 2005). Thus, if 
lenders’ demand for conservatism is not satisfied adequately by GAAP-compliant financial 
statements, they may contractually negotiate adjustments to the GAAP reported accounting 
numbers which introduce additional conservatism. For example, net worth covenants may require 
that updates to net worth calculations include losses in full, but profits only partially (the “income 
escalators” highlighted in Beatty et al. 2008). Other examples are loan contract terms which 
exclude extraordinary gains but not extraordinary losses, or exclude gains from asset sales or asset 
write-ups, but not the corresponding losses. These conservative modifications may impact 
definitions of net income, cash flow, or net worth (Li 2010).8 Since the literature has not 
conclusively shown whether such contractual modifications are sought in addition to, or in lieu of, 
GAAP provided conservatism, we do not make a directional prediction and state our first 
hypothesis in null form. 
H1 (contracting choices, in null form): After the Credit Lyonnais ruling, the use of contractual 
modifications in loan contracts which introduce greater conservatism is no different for 
affected and unaffected firms. 
  
                                                            
8 Non-financial covenants which place restrictions on borrowers’ actions can also be put in place. These may include 
restrictions relating to payouts, investing, and financing activities (Nikolaev 2010). It is likely that the different 
protective mechanisms available to a lender will have different implementation and/or monitoring costs, and the choice 
among the various options available will depend on a variety of factors, including the gap between desirability and 
availability of conservatively prepared GAAP financial statements. 
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Changes in GAAP financial reporting around the Credit Lyonnais ruling 
 The Credit Lyonnais ruling had the effect of strengthening creditors’ power since it 
required directors to act on creditors’ behalf in an expanded set of circumstances, and not just 
when the firm is in default. Moreover, this power shift is more pronounced for firms closer to 
default, i.e., in the vicinity of insolvency, and only applies to Delaware-incorporated firms. 
 One way for directors to fulfil their enhanced fiduciary duties in favor of creditors is to 
ensure that the latter are provided with sufficiently conservative accounting information which 
will help protect the creditors’ interests. A related line of research, motivated by the debt covenant 
hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), predicts aggressive, or anti-conservative, accounting 
choices leading up to bankruptcy filings or financial distress.9 Sweeney (1994) and DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) suggest income-increasing choices for firms that eventually file bankruptcy or 
experience technical default, consistent with a debt-equity conflict. However, the evidence of 
DeAngelo et al. (1994) suggests negative income accruals and charges are more likely for firms 
experiencing financial distress. Thus, the evidence is mixed from the early studies which utilized 
small samples and extreme events to identify the firms (e.g., bankruptcy, dividend cuts).  
 A more recent study (Pryshchepa, Aretz and Banerjee 2013) examines finance and 
accounting choices for firms that declare bankruptcy. They split the sample into firms that ex-ante 
appear to be distressed according to several accounting and market-based prediction models 
(Altman 1968; Merton 1974). They conclude that firms that appear to be in better financial health, 
but eventually declare bankruptcy, are the ones that engaged in aggressive accounting to the 
detriment of creditors. Yet, like the earlier research, this paper faces identification problems, as 
the treatment firms are those experiencing an extreme event—actual bankruptcy.  
                                                            
9 According to the debt covenant hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986), managers make income-increasing 
accounting choices for the benefit of shareholders at the expense of creditors. 
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 Aier et al. (2014) address the identification problem by using Credit Lyonnais as an 
instrument that constituted a shock affecting Delaware-incorporated firms. They document 
increases in general measures of GAAP conservatism for firms affected by the ruling but not for 
other firms.10 While ex-post we observe their results, ex-ante it is not obvious that a change in 
fiduciary duty introduced by the legal ruling would have a first-order effect on accounting. It is 
possible that, even if the investing behaviors documented by Becker and Strömberg (2012) change, 
managers may still use their discretion when preparing financial statements to maintain slack, per 
the debt covenant hypothesis.11 On the other hand, articles in accounting practitioner journals point 
to the risk that external auditors face from creditors during the bankruptcy process—suggesting 
that lenders are keen to receive accounting signals in a timely manner and they may use litigation 
as a tool if they do not (see Demers 2009; Lamont 2003). 
 We shed light on this debate by examining several options for discretionary financial 
reporting and capture individual income items that a creditor might be interested in when assessing 
performance. Our approach paints a more complete picture of both the preparation and use of 
conservative accounting numbers since the accounting choice analysis complements the contract 
design analysis we conduct to test H1.  
The first accounting choice we investigate is abnormal accruals as a measure of overall 
discretionary accounting choices made by firms.12 We expect that abnormal accruals for affected 
                                                            
10 In their main analyses, Aier et al.’s (2014) measure of accounting conservatism is a composite firm-year score based 
on average decile rankings for multiple conservatism proxies that have been used in prior studies. They also present 
results based on asymmetric timeliness measures of Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2006). However, all of 
these measures are lacking in their ability to provide insight into which specific areas of the financial statements were 
subject to increased conservative reporting in affected firms post Credit Lyonnais. 
11 Becker and Strömberg (2012) document that affected firms increased equity issuances and investments in capital 
assets and R&D expenditures, consistent with the debt overhang hypothesis. 
12 Change in accruals was the common measure of discretionary reporting in the early literature on this topic (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994; DeAngelo et al. 1994), though we now have the benefit of more sophisticated – though far from 
perfect – expectations models. 
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firms are lower following the ruling than for unaffected firms. Since the change is due to enhanced 
fiduciary duties towards creditors, it is possible that the decrease in abnormal accruals is due 
mainly to greater negative abnormal accruals, or lower positive abnormal accruals, or a 
combination of both. As we do not have any a priori prediction about which sign of abnormal 
accruals is mostly affected, we treat this particular question as one to be addressed empirically. 
 Second, we focus on an accounting choice that conveys timely information about bad news: 
negative special items (including asset impairments, write-downs, and restructuring). If the 
increase in conservatism documented in prior research is driven at least partly by a greater 
propensity and willingness by the affected firms to record these charges, we expect these firms to 
exhibit more negative special items post Credit Lyonnais. 
 Third, we investigate differential patterns of adoption of SFAS 106 by affected and 
unaffected firms. The implementation of SFAS 106 occurred soon after Credit Lyonnais and 
required all employers to switch to accrual accounting (from what was previously predominantly 
cash accounting) for their other postretirement employee benefits (OPEBs) for fiscal years starting 
after December 15, 1992. We focus on SFAS 106 because the new standard offered great 
managerial discretion in terms of its adoption and implementation. In particular, firms could 
choose either immediate or delayed recognition of their OPEB liabilities. Although both methods 
required full disclosure of the total OPEB liability in the footnotes, their impacts on the financial 
statements were drastically different. Firms delaying recognition not only avoid a one-time large 
negative shock to net income, but also present lower liabilities balances on their balance sheets. 
We expect that affected firms will be more likely to adopt the immediate recognition method.  
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Formally, our second hypothesis is: 
H2 (accounting choices): After the Credit Lyonnais ruling, firms which are incorporated in 
Delaware and which are close to default exhibit lower abnormal accruals, greater 
magnitude and incidence of negative special items, and are more likely to adopt SFAS 106 
using the immediate recognition method for OPEB liabilities, compared to other firms. 
 
3. Data and analyses 
Sample selection 
To test H1 about contracting choices by firms and their lenders, we hand-collect a sample 
of loan contracts reported by borrowing firms in various SEC filings. For tractability, we restrict 
loan contracts to the years 1989 to 1994 (three years before and after the ruling). We describe the 
data collection procedures in more detail in Appendix 2. The loan contracts sample consists of 261 
private loan contracts signed in the years 1989-1994. We extract data on debt covenant terms, 
noting any conservative modifications to accounting numbers involving asymmetric treatments of 
gains and losses. 
In order to examine the borrowing firms’ accounting choices and test H2, we also collect 
financial statements data from the Compustat/CRSP database corresponding to what would have 
been available on the dates the loan contracts are signed.  
 
Empirical strategy 
We examine accounting and contracting choices using the following difference-in-
difference regression specification: 
Yit = β0 + βi Afterlawt × Affectedi + γAffectedi + δ'Xi,t + IndustryFE + YearFE + εi,t          (1) 
14 
 
Y refers to the various proxies for contracting and accounting choices, i indexes firms and 
t time (years). The Afterlaw variable is an indicator equal to one from 1992-1994, zero otherwise. 
The Affected dummy is equal to one if the firm is DE-incorporated and is close to insolvency, zero 
otherwise.13 Xi,t represents a vector of control variables. IndustryFE denotes industry fixed effects, 
YearFE year fixed effects, and εi,t the residual. As in Becker and Strömberg (2012), we do not 
include a separate Afterlaw indicator as it is absorbed in the year fixed effects. In all our 
regressions, we cluster standard errors at the state of incorporation level.  
Our identification strategy benefits from the fact that the Credit Lyonnais ruling set a 
precedent for DE-incorporated firms but had no prejudicial power for other firms. The impact and 
scope of the ruling continue to be debated and interpreted in subsequent Delaware cases.14 Our 
identification draws the juristic distinction between DE-incorporated firms and non-DE-
incorporated firms. To the extent that other state jurisdictions may incorporate the results of 
Delaware rulings, this works against finding a significant treatment effect. 
 
Proxies for contracting and accounting choices  
Use of income escalators and conservative definitions of cash flows, net income, or net worth in 
loan contracts 
In order to establish whether or not conservative contract modifications are made, we focus 
on income escalators (Beatty et al. 2008) and conservative definitions of net income, cash flows, 
                                                            
13 Following Becker and Strömberg (2012), our main measure of proximity to insolvency is Merton’s distance-to-
default measure. Merton’s (1974) model uses the market value of a firm’s equity in calculating default risk. We 
construct the distance-to-default measure following Vassalou and Xing (2004), who employ Merton’s model to 
estimate the value of contingent claims on the firm’s assets. We classify firms with Merton measure below the median 
value in 1990 (i.e., immediately before the ruling) as being closer to insolvency.  
14 Two more recent Delaware cases, Production Resources (2004) and Gheewalla (2007), represent a partial reversal 
of Credit Lyonnais. After these two cases, directors have a defense, which did not exist before Credit Lyonnais, against 
lawsuits by owners but no additional exposure to lawsuits from creditors. When we examine the change in financial 
accounting choices following these rulings, we do not observe a weakening of our main results. 
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or net worth (Li 2010). The typical income escalator clause stipulates changes to net worth 
calculations which incorporate future profits only partially and future losses in full. The first 
dependent variable, D(Escalator), is an indicator variable equal to one if the net worth covenant 
includes an income escalator, and zero otherwise. The second dependent variable, D(ConsDef), is 
an indicator equal to one if the definition of income, cash flow or net worth in a debt contract 
includes specific line items (e.g., extraordinary items) for losses but not for gains, and zero 
otherwise. 
Both types of conservative modifications result in greater protection for lenders. Since 
public filings are made every fiscal quarter whereas loan contracts occur with lower frequency, we 
conjecture that borrowing firms first make accounting choices with respect to the degree of 
conservatism to incorporate in their filings. In response to the accounting choices made by 
managers in their public financial reporting, lenders may alter the terms of loan contracts. We 
assess contracting choices through changes in the likelihood of observing conservative 
modifications in loan contracts of affected and unaffected firms, before and after Credit Lyonnais.  
 
Abnormal accruals 
The first set of proxies for accounting choice are abnormal accrual measures, which have 
been widely used to study earnings management. We first examine performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005). Specifically, we estimate the following model by 
industry-year using all available firm-years from the Compustat/CRSP database over our sample 
period 1989 to 1994, requiring at least 20 observations (industries are based on the Fama-French 
48 industries classification): 
TAi,t = α0 + α1∆Revi,t+ α2PPEi,t+ α3ROAi,t+εi,t                       (2) 
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where TAi,t is total accruals of firm i in year t (measured as the change in non-cash current assets 
minus the change in current non-interest-bearing liabilities, minus depreciation and amortization 
expense, scaled by average total assets); ∆Revi,t is the annual change in revenues scaled by average 
total assets; PPEi,t is property, plant, and equipment scaled by average total assets; and ROAi,t is 
return on assets. The residuals from regression model (2) for our sample firms constitute their 
abnormal accruals. We use the absolute value of abnormal accruals and we further split this into 
positive (negative) abnormal accruals, which take the absolute value of abnormal accruals when 
they are positive (negative), and zero otherwise. 
Our second abnormal accrual measure is based on the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). We estimate the 
following model by year for each Fama-French 48 industry with at least 20 observations: 
TAi,t = α0 + α1CFOi,t-1 + α2CFOi,t + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4∆Revi,t+ α5PPEi,t+εi,t       (3) 
where CFO is operating cash flow (measured as the sum of net income, depreciation and 
amortization, and changes in current liabilities, minus changes in current assets, scaled by average 
total assets). The residuals from Equation (3) represent abnormal accruals not associated with 
operating cash flows that cannot be explained by the change in revenue and the level of PPE. 
 
Negative special items 
A second proxy reflecting managers’ accounting choice are income-decreasing special 
charges, such as impairments and restructurings.15 These special charges are a set of observable 
accounting accruals that directly communicate bad economic news to financial statement users. In 
addition to the total (signed) amount of special items booked, we also examine the variable 
                                                            
15 Prior to 2001, Compustat does not have fields relating separately to asset impairments and restructuring charges. 
Also, we do not examine extraordinary items separately because they are extremely rare. 
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|Neg SPI|, which takes the absolute value of negative special charges and zero otherwise. The 
higher the value of |Neg SPI|, the more negative special charges are booked by firms.16 
 
Adoption of SFAS 106 
We next examine differential patterns in adopting SFAS 106, which was issued by the 
FASB in December 1990. It required firms to recognize an on-balance sheet liability for the present 
value of other postretirement employee benefits (OPEB) expected to be paid to active and retired 
employees, distinct from pensions. The standard was effective for fiscal years starting after 
December 15, 1992. 
We focus on SFAS 106 because the new standard was implemented shortly after the court 
ruling and firms were permitted to adopt with either immediate or delayed recognition of the 
estimated liability. Under immediate recognition, the after-tax transition obligation as of the 
beginning of the adoption year was charged to net income, with a corresponding increase to long-
term liabilities. Under delayed recognition, the before-tax transition obligation could be deferred 
and amortized for as long as 20 years.17 Thus, firms delaying recognition could avoid a one-time 
large negative shock to net income, and keep their on-balance sheet liabilities at a lower level.18 
For this test, we analyze all firms on Compustat/CRSP in the year of SFAS 106 transition because 
only a small number of the hand-collected sample of loan firms were subject to the standard. 
                                                            
16 Mechanically, there might be some overlap between special items and our discretionary accrual measures. For 
example, if the special items include inventory impairments or the establishment of short-term reserves for 
restructuring liabilities, those transactions could be reflected in accruals. In Table 1, the correlation between the special 
items and negative accruals is around 0.21, suggesting that they are related but not redundant. 
17 With delayed recognition, the transition obligation or asset was to be amortized on a straight-line basis over the 
average remaining service period of active plan participants, except that (a) if the remaining service period was less 
than 20 years, the employer could elect to use 20 years, and (b) if all or almost all of the plan participants were inactive, 
the employer had to use the average remaining life expectancy period of those participants. (Section 112, SFAS 106). 
18 Both methods required full disclosure of the total liability in the notes to financial statements. However, their impact 
on the financial statements in the year of adoption were drastically different. Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt and Cristea 
(1993) estimate that if immediate recognition method was elected, the cumulative effect would be a 73% median 
decrease in income in the year of adoption. With delayed recognition, income decreased by approximately 8%. 
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Control variables 
In the contracting choice regressions, we include control variables specific to contracting 
choices, following Beatty et al. (2008). These controls include covenant intensity (number of 
financial covenants in the loan contract), loan maturity, loan size (scaled by lagged total assets), 
spread above LIBOR, indicator variables for inclusion of performance pricing and for revolver 
loans, as well as firm size (log of market value of equity) and growth rate in sales.  
We also control for the following factors. The Delaware court ruling may affect corporate 
behavior (e.g., capital structure) and the risk profile of the company, which in turn may affect how 
the accounting system translates economic events to the financial statements. For example, Myers 
(1977) describes the debt overhang problem in which equity holders may be reluctant to raise new 
equity capital for positive NPV investments when most of the return on investment would go to 
creditors. Becker and Strömberg (2012) show that investment and equity issuance increase for 
firms affected by Credit Lyonnais, which they interpret as indicating a reduction in the debt 
overhang problem. To assess whether the financial reporting effects we document are driven by 
the change in affected firms’ financing and investing behaviors, we control for the change in 
investment and equity issuance. We measure investment by capital expenditure divided by total 
assets.19 Following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), equity issuance is an indicator variable equal 
to one if stock issuance is positive, where stock issues are defined as the change in book equity 
minus changes in retained earnings adjusted for deferred taxes, normalized by lagged assets.20  
A second concern is the risk substitution problem, in which equity holders may have 
incentives to increase the riskiness of existing assets (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Becker and 
                                                            
19 We obtain very similar results when we further control for R&D/Assets. 
20 Note that, in addition to including variables for financing and investing behaviors as control variables in our main 
tests using equation (1), in our tests examining abnormal accruals, our proxies for discretionary accruals explicitly 
account for changes in investing behaviors (the accruals models in equations (2) and (3) control for PPE levels). 
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Strömberg (2012) show that both market-based and accounting-based performance volatilities 
decrease for firms affected by the court rulings, which they interpret as indicating a decline in the 
risk substitution problem. We therefore control for the change in risk profile of the company using 
two variables. Equity volatility is calculated as the annualized monthly standard deviation of the 
stock return. ROA volatility (standard deviation of ROA for each year using quarterly Compustat 
data) captures volatility in accounting-based performance. 
We also consider determinants of non-discretionary accruals that are likely to be correlated 
with investment opportunities that are financed with the new external investment identified by 
Becker and Strömberg (2012), and we further control for variables that explain abnormal accruals 
and special charges. As discussed in Dechow (1994) and Dechow and Dichev (2002), firms in 
different stages of their life cycle may have different discretionary accruals. Moreover, we 
acknowledge the literature that models the determinants of special charges (Francis, Hanna and 
Vincent 1996; Bens and Johnston 2009). We thus include as controls measures of firm age, firm 
performance (ROA and stock returns), sales growth, market-to-book ratio, sales growth, and 
leverage to capture change in financial risk. Leverage is defined as short-term debt plus long-term 
debt minus cash holding, all scaled by total assets. 
In summary, in the controls described above, we are measuring changes in the real 
investment and financing decisions made by DE-incorporated firms that Becker and Strömberg 
(2012) attribute to the Credit Lyonnais ruling. It is possible that these corporate changes drive 
changes in reporting behavior, as opposed to these reporting changes being directly affected by the 
legal ruling, per se. Controlling for these forces provides a clearer, and thus more causal, 
interpretation about how the change in fiduciary duty affects financial reporting. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our loan contracts sample. Since there are few 
studies of loan contracts from early time periods before the widespread availability of machine-
readable filings (which started in 1994), we highlight comparisons with a more recent sample 
which is widely used in academic research (Nini, Smith, and Sufi 2009). 
Table 1, panel A shows the distribution of contracts by year of signing and DE vs. non-DE. 
Of the 261 contracts collected, 147 are by DE firms and 114 by non-DE firms. After reading all 
the contracts, we ascertain that 190 (74%) of these contracts contain net worth covenants. Panel B 
shows descriptive statistics for both our sample (loans from 1989 to 1994) and the Nini et al. (2009) 
sample (1996 to 2005). Aside from the time period, another difference in sample composition is 
that Nini et al. only include contracts with a table of contents because they rely on machine-
readable contracts electronically available on EDGAR. Our sample was not subject to this 
constraint. Moreover, the starting point for the Nini et al. sample is the Dealscan database from 
Loan Pricing Corporation, which has a focus on syndicated loans, whereas our procedure samples 
directly from companies’ regulatory filings regardless of the type of loan. 
We note several interesting patterns. Panel B shows that our sample picks up relatively 
smaller loans (mean of $95 million compared to $435 million). Only 23% of the loans we examine 
have performance pricing (75% for the Nini et al. sample). This pattern is consistent with the 
observation in Asquith et al. (2005) that performance pricing is a relatively new feature of debt 
contracts after 1994. Loans from our earlier sample period are much more likely to contain balance 
sheet covenants (net worth covenants are present in 72% of our sample) than the later period 
covered by the Nini et al. sample (45%). This pattern is consistent with the declining use of balance 
sheet covenants documented in Demerjian (2011). Income escalators constitute 38% of the net 
worth covenants in our sample. The corresponding proportion for income escalators for loans from 
21 
 
the period 1994-2004 as reported in Beatty et al. (2008) is two-thirds, again highlighting that the 
use of income escalators has increased significantly in later years. We find conservative 
contractual definitions involving differential treatment of specific items of gains and losses (such 
as extraordinary items, gains from asset sales, and gains from asset write-up) in 35% of the 
contracts.  
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. Panel B shows that the control variables 
are not highly correlated, suggesting multicollinearity is likely not an issue in our specifications. 
 
Results  
Use of income escalators and other conservative modifications in loan contracts 
Table 3 reports the results of our analyses of loan contract modifications. We run logit 
regressions of the use of conservative loan modifications on an indicator variable for affected firms 
(DE-incorporated and in the zone of insolvency), an interaction term between Afterlaw and 
Affected, and control variables. In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal 
to one if an income escalator is used, and zero otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable is 
an indicator for the use of conservative definitions of cash flows, net income, or net worth in the 
loan contract. We find significantly lower use of income escalators and conservative definitions 
for affected firms after the ruling. This result suggests that, for DE firms, when there is an 
exogenous increase in fiduciary duties which favors creditors, lenders require less protection in 
the form of covenant modifications of GAAP numbers which introduce additional conservatism. 
A caveat to the above results is that we can only observe these conservative modifications 
in loan contracts if the loan contracts contain covenants in the first place. Becker and Strömberg 
(2012) find decreased reliance on covenants for public bondholders in affected firms following 
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Credit Lyonnais. To address this concern, we implement a two-stage Heckman-type model in 
which the first stage is a regression of covenant intensity on loan characteristics as in Becker and 
Strömberg (2012), and the predicted values for covenant intensity are then used in the logit 
regressions. In untabulated analyses, the results continue to hold.  
 
Discretionary accruals 
We now turn our attention to accounting choices made by firms before and after the ruling. 
We expect that, following Credit Lyonnais, DE firms are more likely to record lower levels of 
accruals than they did in previous years compared to non-DE firms, i.e., the debt covenant 
hypothesis effect will be weakened in these firms.21  
We first examine discretionary accounting choices. Table 4 shows the results for the firms 
in our hand-collected sample for which the discretionary accruals measures are available. Columns 
1 and 2 report results for signed discretionary accrual measures based on Kothari et al. (2005) and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), respectively. The results suggest that there are significant reductions 
in discretionary accruals among affected firms relative to control groups. The reduction in 
abnormal accruals could be driven by reductions in either positive abnormal accruals or negative 
abnormal accruals or a combination of both. Since creditors are mainly exposed to downside risks, 
we expect the effects to be more pronounced for negative abnormal accruals. To test this 
conjecture, we split abnormal accruals into positive and negative accruals. Positive (negative) 
accruals take the absolute value of abnormal accruals when they are positive (negative) and zero 
                                                            
21 Our prediction is similar to the interpretation by DeAngelo et al. (1994) who examined 76 dividend-cutting firms 
and suggest that the increased monitoring by creditors encouraged management to book more negative items so that 
the lenders have a clearer picture of the likelihood of repayment. We expand on DeAngelo et al. (1994) by re-
examining a similar question but in a different setting with an exogenous legal ruling that strengthened the force of 
management’s duties to creditors. 
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otherwise. Results in Columns 3-4 suggest that there is a significant increase (in absolute value) 
in income-decreasing abnormal accruals relative to control firms. We find no significant difference 
in income-increasing abnormal accruals (untabulated). The results are robust using different 
accrual proxies. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that the accounting system 
reflects the preferences of the primary financial information users, and when management’s 
fiduciary duty towards creditors is strengthened relative to shareholders, the accounting system 
reflects more timely recognition of losses.  
 
Negative special items 
Next, we examine an accounting choice that conveys timely information about bad 
economic news: negative special items (which include asset impairments, write-downs and 
restructurings). We predict that, following Credit Lyonnais, DE firms are more likely to record 
negative special items than they did in previous years compared to non-DE firms. As with our 
prediction for operating accruals, as managers’ fiduciary duties experience a shift towards 
creditors, their financial accounting choices are less likely to conform to the debt covenant 
hypothesis. Further, in this case, we expect managers to use their discretion to report bad news via 
these special items, as this is an information preference of creditors (Ball 2001; Watts 2003). 
The results in Table 5 show that affected firms report more income-decreasing special 
items. Similar to the discretionary accruals tests, we explore whether this pattern is achieved by 
reporting less positive special items or by reporting more negative special items. Column 2 shows 
that there is a significant increase in the amount of income-decreasing special charges in affected 
firms relative to control firms. Untabulated results show that there is no difference in the amount 
of income-increasing special items reported by affected and unaffected firms before and after 
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Credit Lyonnais. These results confirm that the change in accounting choices in affected firms 
mainly occur in areas of financial reporting which are of interest to lenders concerned more about 
downsides than upsides. 
 
SFAS 106 adoption 
We next examine differential patterns of SFAS 106 adoption by DE vs. non-DE firms. We 
consider the entire population of firms on Compustat22. We identify firms with non-zero 
accumulated OPEB liability during the first fiscal year that they are required to comply with the 
new standard. Our final sample consists of 1,186 observations.23 
We construct two measures to capture the accounting choice made at adoption. The first 
variable, Ratio, is the ratio of the Postretirement Unrecognized Transition Obligations (Compustat 
data item Pruto) to Postretirement Accumulated Benefit Obligation (Prac). The lower the ratio, 
the more of the transition obligation that is recognized during the first year of adoption. The extent 
of transition obligation will vary with firm size, so our second variable, Pruto/AT, scales Pruto by 
total assets instead of total accumulated benefit obligation. This measures the extent of 
unrecognized transition obligation relative to firm size and, the lower the ratio, the more the 
transition obligation is recognized during the first year of adoption. 
Table 6 shows that Ratio is lower for affected firms, suggesting that they recognize 
significantly more transition obligation on the balance sheet (i.e., less unrecognized transitional 
liabilities) during the first year of adoption. The result for Pruto/AT (column 2) is not statistically 
                                                            
22 Ramesh and Revsine (2001) find that firms in regulated industries may behave strategically in adopting SFAS 106. 
We control for industry characteristics during industry fixed effect. However, our results remain robust when we 
exclude regulated industries (financial and utility). 
23  We start out with a cross-sectional sample of 1,599 firms and we lose 49 observations due to missing ROA 
information, 257 observations due to missing stock return and book-to-market ratio, 25 observations due to missing 
equity issuance information, 13 observations due to missing volatility information and 69 observations due to missing 
distance-to-default measure. 
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significant. The coefficients on the control variables are generally in line with those found in prior 
studies. For example, we find that more levered firms are more likely to defer recognition of 
liability on financial statements (Amir and Ziv 1997).  
Taken together, our results on contracting and accounting choices made by various groups 
of firms around the Credit Lyonnais ruling suggest a substitution effect between GAAP 
conservatism and contracting conservatism in loan contracts. In response to an exogenous increase 
in fiduciary duties towards creditors, firms that are affected (i.e., are Delaware-incorporated and 
in the vicinity of insolvency) supply more conservatively-prepared financial statements. 
Specifically, affected firms use more income-decreasing discretionary accruals, record more 
negative special charges, and are more likely to recognize OPEB liabilities when adopting SFAS 
106. At the same time, lenders appear to have a reduced demand for conservatism in loan contract 
modifications via altered definitions of accounting numbers as ex-ante protection in financial 
contracting transactions. Becker and Strömberg (2012) also document such ex-ante responses in 
the form of lower reliance on covenants when bonds are issued by affected firms; this result is 
consistent with our interpretation of how ex-post accounting choices resulting in greater GAAP 
conservatism—as a form of financial reporting supply—decrease the ex-ante demands for 
contractual modifications to earnings. 
 
4. Robustness analyses 
Causality 
Inferences from the difference-in-difference methodology rely on the assumption that, 
absent the treatment effect, both treated and control firms would have changed at the same rate 
over the time periods. To assess whether this is plausible, we test for a parallel trend prior to the 
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treatment. We replace the Afterlaw dummy with four year dummies: Afterlaw(t=-1), Afterlaw(t=0), 
Afterlaw(t=1) and Afterlaw(t>=2).24 As shown in Table 7, none of the pre-event variables are 
significant. This suggests that the parallel trend assumption is not violated. Furthermore, 
differences in both contracting and accounting choices start to be significantly different from 1992 
or, for some proxies, from 1993 onwards.25 
The results also rule out reverse causality, in which the court ruling is an outcome of 
lobbying at the state of incorporation level. If a broad coalition of DE-incorporated firms, all 
experiencing increases in income-decreasing accruals and special charges, for example, 
successfully influenced the court decisions, then causality might be reversed. If this were the case, 
we should already see an effect of the court ruling prior to its passage (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2003; Armstrong, Karthik and Cohen 2013).  
 
Business cycle variation across geographic regions and industries 
The court ruling passed in 1991, just after an economic recession in early 1990. It is 
unlikely that our results are driven by an economic recession affecting DE firms 
disproportionately, given that the court ruling affected firms at the state of incorporation level 
rather than the states in which they physically operate.26 However, to mitigate this concern, we use  
(1) state of headquarters location fixed effects to capture the impact of variations in state-level 
business conditions, and (2) industry fixed effects to capture the impact of variations across 
                                                            
24 Afterlaw(t=-1) is a dummy equal to one if the court ruling will pass one year from now. Afterlaw(t=0) is a dummy 
equal to one if the court ruling passed this year, and Afterlaw(t=1) and Afterlaw(t>=2) are dummies equal to one if the 
court ruling passed one year ago and two or more years ago, respectively. 
25 We are not able to perform event-time difference-in-difference analysis for SFAS 106 due to cross-sectional nature 
of the tests. 
26 We are not aware of any research suggesting that DE firms as a group share any physical, geographic concentration 
within the U.S. that could have made them more or less susceptible to the recession than non-DE firms 
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industry groups on contracting and accounting choices. Table 8 shows that our results are not 
driven by variations in business cycle across industries or geographic regions. 
 
Alternative measures of insolvency 
 
Although we believe that the Merton-based distance-to-default measure represents a 
reasonable measure of insolvency risks because it incorporates investors’ expectation of future 
default risk (Vassalou and Xing 2004), we repeat our analyses using Altman’s Z-Score 
(Altman 1968) to capture near insolvency. Firms with a Z-Score below the median 1990 value are 
classified as being close to default. Table 9 shows that we continue to find similar results for both 
contracting and accounting choices. 
 
Firm fixed effects 
 
In our tests of H1, we have used logit specifications with industry fixed effects. We repeat 
the tests using firm fixed effects and OLS specifications for H1 and using firm fixed effects for H2 
(in these specifications, the Affected main effects are dropped). The paper’s conclusions continue 
to hold if we use the alternative specifications with firm fixed effects.  
  
Regression by quartile of distance-to-default 
 
In our main specification, we simply partition the sample based on whether distance-to-
default is below or above the median. This binary cutoff is somewhat arbitrary and the likelihood 
that a firm considers itself close to distress may change in a more gradual fashion. We repeat the 
analysis by sorting firms into solvency quartiles. We run regressions (untabulated) which allow us 
to examine the gradual change in accounting or loan contracting choices as firms move towards 
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insolvency, and we find that much of the effects documented in this paper are concentrated in the 
quartile of firms closest to financial distress, as we would expect.  
  
Leverage effects 
 
If the effects we document in this paper are driven by creditors’ concerns, we would expect 
them to be stronger in firms carrying greater amounts of debt in their capital structure. Higher 
leverage indicates greater bargaining power of creditors, and thus more pressure on directors to 
ensure the supply of adequately conservative financial reports, among other things. 
We find in untabulated tests that the abnormal accruals and special charges results are more 
pronounced in firms with higher leverage; this is not the case for the OPEB transition choice. In 
the loan contracts regressions, we find stronger results for both income escalators and more general 
conservative modifications for highly levered firms. These results support our conjecture that the 
changes in financial reporting occurring around Credit Lyonnais were driven in part by the 
enhanced fiduciary duties of directors towards creditors. In firms with higher leverage, the interests 
of creditors play a more salient role in terms of how directors believe they can best fulfill their 
fiduciary duties in response to the ruling.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We exploit an exogenous shift in the balance of power between creditors and shareholders 
to examine how firms’ accounting and contracting choices are affected by managerial fiduciary 
duties. A Delaware court ruling in the 1991 Credit Lyonnais case provides a natural experiment to 
examine this question. The ruling increased officers and directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors of 
firms that are solvent but are in the vicinity of insolvency. Prior to the ruling, it was held that 
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management owes fiduciary duties to creditors only after the firm becomes insolvent. The ruling 
shifted the balance of power in favor of creditors thereby mitigating the debt-equity conflict. 
Adopting a difference-in-difference empirical design, we find that debt contracts of 
affected firms rely less on the use of income escalators and other conservative modifications 
following the ruling. We also find that affected firms exhibit lower abnormal accruals, report more 
negative special items, and are more likely to adopt SFAS 106 using the immediate recognition 
method for OPEB liabilities following the ruling. We conduct a battery of sensitivity analyses for 
alternative explanations and find that our results are robust to these tests. Overall, our study 
demonstrates how a shift in the relative strengths of the duties owed by managers to creditors 
versus shareholders changes the nature of both financial reporting and debt contracting. 
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Appendix 1 Variables definitions 
 
Variables Definition 
D(Escalator) Dummy equal to one if the net worth covenant includes an income escalator and zero otherwise. 
D(ConsDef) 
Dummy equal to one if the definition of income, cash flow or net worth in a debt contract 
includes losses but not gains for specific line items (e.g., extraordinary items) and zero 
otherwise. 
Signed DA-KWL 
Discretionary accrual estimated from Kothari et al (2005) model for each year and each Fama-
French 48 industry that has at least 20 observations. We regress total accrual on change in 
revenue, change in PPE and ROA. Discretionary accrual takes the value of residual from 
regression. 
Signed DA-DD 
Discretionary accrual estimated from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model for each year and 
each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 20 observations. We regress total accrual on 
current, lead and lagged operating cash flow, change in revenue and PPE. Discretionary 
accrual takes the value of residual from regression. 
|Neg DA-KWL| 
Absolute value of negative discretionary accrual from Kothari et al (2005) model for each 
year and each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 20 observations. We regress total 
accrual on change in revenue, change in PPE and ROA. Negative discretionary accrual takes 
the absolute value of the residual if residual is below zero and zero otherwise. 
|Neg DA-DD| 
Absolute value of negative discretionary accrual from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model for 
each year and each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 20 observations. We regress 
total accrual on current, lead and lagged operating cash flow, change in revenue and PPE. 
Negative discretionary accrual takes the absolute value of the residual if residual is below 
zero and zero otherwise. 
Signed SPI/AT Special charges (Compustat data item 17) scaled by total asset (item 6) 
|Neg SPI/AT| Absolute value of negative special charges scaled by total asset. If special charges are positive, it takes value of zero 
Ratio Postretirement Unrecognized Transition Obligations / Postretirement Accumulated Benefit Obligation 
Pruto/AT Postretirement Unrecognized Transition Obligations / Total Assets 
Affected 
Dummy equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Delaware and is close to insolvency 
according to insolvency measure (either distance to default or Z-score) and zero otherwise. A 
firm is defined as close to insolvency if the distance to default or Z-score is below median in 
1990 (one year immediate before passing the ruling). 
Afterlaw Dummy equal to one if year>1991 
Cov Intensity Number of financial covenants 
Maturity Maturity of loans in years 
Loan/Assets Loan amount/Total assets 
Ppricing Dummy equal to one if performance pricing is included in the loan contracts and zero otherwise 
Revolver Dummy equal to one if the agreement contains a line of credit/revolver and zero otherwise 
Spread The interest rate spread over LIBOR for loans without performance pricing 
Rating 
A pooled cross-sectional regression of the debt rating on a set of financial variables (total 
assets, ROA, debt to assets, dividend indicator, subordinated debt indicator and a loss 
indicator is estimated for rated firms. The regression parameter estimates and the firm’s 
financial information are then used to predict credit ratings for each firm-year. The ratings 
for sample firms are between 1 (AAA) and 24 (C) 
ROA Log of one plus ROA, where ROA is net income (item 18) over lagged total asset (item 6) 
Sales Growth change in sales over lagged sales (item 12) 
BTM Book equity(item 60) over market equity(item 199*item 25) 
Stock Return Log of one plus stock return over past 12 months 
Firm Size Log of total asset (item 6) 
Firm Age Log of firm age, where firm age is the year firm first appear in CRSP 
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Appendix 1 Variables definitions, cont’d 
 
Variables Definition 
Firm Leverage Short term debt (item 34)+long term debt (item 9)-cash (item 1), all over total asset (item 6) 
Capx/Asset Capital Expenditure (item 128) over total asset (item 6) 
D(Issue Equity) 
Following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), D(Issue Equity) is an indicator variable equal to 
one if stock issuance is positive, where stock issuance is calculated as change in common 
equity plus change in deferred tax minus change in retained earnings, all scaled by total asset, 
and zero otherwise 
Equity Volatility Equity volatility is calculated as the log of annualized monthly standard deviation of the stock return, taken from CRSP 
ROA Volatility ROA volatility is calculated as the log of standard deviation of quarterly ROA, where ROA is net income (item 18) over lagged total asset (item 6) 
IO Percentage of outstanding equity owned by institutions. 
Afterlaw(t=-1) Dummy equal to one if it is one year before the passage of court ruling and zero otherwise 
Afterlaw(t=0) Dummy equal to one if it is the year during which court ruling passes and zero otherwise 
Afterlaw(t=1) Dummy equal to one if it is one year after the passage of ruling and zero otherwise 
Afterlaw(t>=2) Dummy equal to one if it is 2 or more years after the passage of ruling and zero otherwise 
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Appendix 2 – Procedures for collection of loan sample data 
Since there is no readily available machine-readable data on loan contracts for the time 
period in our study, we conduct our loan choice analysis on a small, hand-collected sample. 
We retrieve loan contracts filed by companies with the SEC. Under SEC Regulation S-K, 
item 601 (b), public firms are required to include all material contracts as exhibits in their filings. 
Most loan contracts can be found in Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K and registration statements, and they 
are typically attached as exhibit item 4 and/or item 10. Because the time period we study is before 
the mandatory implementation of electronic filings on the SEC’s EDGAR system, we manually 
search microfiche records of firms’ filings from Q-File to locate loan contracts. After identifying 
the location of loan contracts from the microfiche records, the next step is to purchase the exhibits 
from commercial data providers because most microfiche records only contain the main filings 
and do not include exhibits. Due to the high cost of data collection, we adopt a random sampling 
strategy to construct the credit agreement sample. The procedure is as follows: 
(1) We focus on firms in our base dataset which have debt to total assets ratio ((dlc + dltt) / 
at) of 10% or more. According to Item 601(b) (4) of Regulation S-K, firms are required to file 
long-term debt instruments only when the debt amount exceeds 10% of total assets. This step 
ensures that the firms we select have a good chance of having “material” debt contracts that need 
to be disclosed as exhibits. 
(2) For each year, we categorize firms into two groups, Delaware and non-Delaware, and 
randomly select 150 firms from each year and each group.27 We locate and read the microfiche 
records for these firms from Q-File. Q-File provides index books containing firm names and filing 
                                                            
27 The distribution of public firms on Compustat between Delaware and non-Delaware incorporation is approximately 
half-half, which is similar to the proportions reported in Daines (2001). 
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types. Firms are alphabetically ordered by name. We manually match our random sample with the 
index book by company name and verify our matches using the EIN numbers from both sources.28 
To make our hand collection work manageable, we only run this random selection procedure four 
times from years 1991 to 1994, and we read the exhibit list of the selected companies’ 10-K 
reports.29 In each 10-K exhibit list, we search for credit agreements that were initiated three years 
before (1989 – 1991) and three years after (1992 – 1994) the Credit Lyonnais ruling. Following 
Beatty, Cheng and Zach (2011), our search looks for key words related to “credit”, “loan” or 
“financing” in the exhibit list.30 If a loan was initiated within the year of the 10-K, the loan contract 
can usually be immediately located in the 10-K using the exhibit number. If a loan was initiated 
prior to the year of the 10-K, the 10-K exhibit list references the type, date and the exhibit number 
of the original filing where the actual copy of the loan was filed. The original filing could be of 
any form, such as 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K and registration statements. 
(3) Since Q-File keeps only the main body of filings but not exhibits, we record the location 
(filing type, date and exhibit number) of the actual copies of the loan contracts and purchase those 
copies from commercial data providers. 
(4) Finally, we read through each loan contract and manually code the variables of interest. 
                                                            
28 When matching by name, we consider both current and historical names of a company.  
29 This simplified approach focusing on 10-Ks is likely to have an innocuous impact on our sample selection for the 
following reasons: Compared to other filing types, a 10-K report has the most comprehensive exhibit list. All material 
loan contracts of a company as of the fiscal year-end will be disclosed in the 10-K exhibit list. The 10-K report 
constitutes a reasonable starting point for our search since it includes loans initiated within the year of the 10-K as 
well as references to loans initiated in the prior periods back to their original filings. Thus, from a company’s 10-K 
exhibit list, we are able to track down the filing where loans were originally filed. 
30 For example, a credit agreement can be called “credit agreement”, “loan agreement”, “credit facility”, “loan and 
security agreement”, “loan & security agreement”, “revolving credit”, “financing and security agreement”, “financing 
& security agreement”, “credit and guarantee agreement”, “credit & guarantee agreement”, “credit and security 
agreement” or “credit & security agreement”.  
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Through the above search procedure steps (1) to (3), we identify 333 exhibit items that are 
likely to be credit agreements. We are able to find 310 copies of exhibits from commercial data 
providers (23 cases cannot be found for various reasons, including cases where the filings refer to 
an exhibit that seemingly was never filed with the SEC). For the 310 exhibit copies, we further 
eliminate 28 copies (3 cases are promissory notes or loan commitment letters without covenant 
details; 2 cases are guaranty or security agreements only; 3 cases are minor amendments or 
incomplete contracts; 16 cases are bond contacts; and 4 cases are unreadable due to low quality of 
the microfiche copies). After further requiring availability of control variable values when 
conducting regressions, our final credit agreement sample consists of 261 loan contracts that were 
initiated in a six-year window around the Credit Lyonnais ruling (“the random credit agreements 
sample”).31 
  
                                                            
31 Only a few studies have examined private loan agreements before 1996 (when electronic filings became mandatory): 
Leftwich (1983) reviews 10 loan agreements from before 1977; Beneish and Press (1993) investigate 96 loan contracts 
or amendments from 1983 to 1987; and Beatty, Ramesh and Weber (2002) study 285 credit agreements that are 
searchable through Lexis-Nexis during 1994 to 1996 (when electronic filings were sparsely available).  
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Appendix 3 – Accounting choices results for full Compustat/CRSP sample 
We present in this appendix the main accounting choices results using the entire population of firms on Compustat/CRSP. We exclude regulated 
industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). Table A3.1 presents results for discretionary accruals and Table A3.2 presents results for special 
items. 
 
Table A3.1 Discretionary accruals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Signed DA-KLW Signed DA-DD |Neg DA-KLW| |Neg DA-DD|           
Afterlaw*Affected -0.016 -0.011 0.012 0.011 
 (-4.20)*** (-1.84)* (3.62)*** (2.30)** Affected 0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
 (1.65) (3.12)*** (-3.49)*** (-5.24)*** ROA 0.052 0.126 -0.037 -0.083 
 (10.00)*** (13.43)*** (-12.19)*** (-13.60)*** Sales Growth 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.004 
 (1.68) (-0.98) (1.67) (3.21)*** BTM 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.05) (-2.93)*** (-1.67) (-1.62) Stock Return -0.002 0.005 0.001 -0.004 
 (-1.99)* (6.22)*** (1.02) (-3.42)*** Firm Size -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.003 
 (-10.15)*** (-7.67)*** (3.30)*** (4.28)*** Firm Age 0.001 0.007 -0.004 -0.008 
 (1.50) (2.82)*** (-4.92)*** (-4.17)*** Firm Leverage 0.024 0.005 -0.007 -0.000 
 (7.62)*** (0.88) (-3.54)*** (-0.08) Capx/Asset 0.018 -0.018 -0.029 -0.010 
 (3.12)*** (-3.21)*** (-8.74)*** (-2.03)** D(Issue Equity) 0.015 0.011 -0.008 -0.005 
 (12.10)*** (10.43)*** (-11.76)*** (-9.31)*** Equity Volatility -0.008 -0.003 0.009 0.007 
 (-3.25)*** (-2.20)** (6.04)*** (6.81)*** ROA Volatility -0.004 -0.008 0.005 0.008 
 (-4.37)*** (-15.69)*** (8.13)*** (20.42)*** IO 0.009 0.010 -0.015 -0.012 
 (1.68)* (1.61) (-2.78)*** (-2.43)**         
Observations 23,775 22,564 23,775 22,564 
R-squared 0.038 0.105 0.064 0.128 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A3.2 Negative special items 
  (1) (2) 
 Signed SPI/AT |Neg SPI/AT|       
Afterlaw*Affected -0.003 0.002 
 (-5.78)*** (5.57)*** Affected 0.002 -0.001 
 (3.49)*** (-3.09)*** ROA 0.062 -0.054 
 (20.41)*** (-19.33)*** Sales Growth 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.81) (-1.30) BTM 0.000 0.000 
 (0.05) (0.65) Stock Return 0.004 -0.003 
 (6.72)*** (-4.73)*** Firm Size -0.004 0.004 
 (-14.88)*** (19.38)*** Firm Age 0.002 -0.001 
 (6.43)*** (-3.50)*** Firm Leverage -0.005 0.005 
 (-3.12)*** (3.72)*** Capx/Asset 0.005 -0.006 
 (1.42) (-1.97)* D(Issue Equity) 0.004 -0.003 
 (6.27)*** (-6.50)*** Equity Volatility 0.001 0.000 
 (1.85)* (0.26) ROA Volatility -0.011 0.013 
 (-20.30)*** (20.79)*** IO -0.014 0.010 
 (-6.48)*** (6.26)***     
Observations 22,573 22,573 
R-squared 0.240 0.298 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics – Loan Contracts 
We hand-collect a random sample of 261 loan contracts from 1989 to 1994. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel A Distribution of the Loan Contracts Sample 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total All Credit Agreements:        
  Delaware 13 26 29 24 32 23 147 
  Non-Delaware 18 17 22 20 22 15 114 
  Total 31 43 51 44 54 38 261 
Credit Agreements with Net Worth Covenant:         
  Delaware 9 21 23 18 24 15 110 
  Non-Delaware 13 13 15 13 17 9 80 
  Total 22 34 38 31 41 24 190 
 
Panel B Summary Characteristics 
 Our Sample Nini et al. (2009) Sample   Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Loan Amount (in $ Millions) 94.7 25.0 261 435.0 190.0 3,717 
Loan Size (Amount/Total Assets) 0.285 0.167 261 0.373 0.253 3,737 
Maturity 3.257 3.000 261 3.875 3.500 3,663 
Spread (basis points above LIBOR) 103.4 75.0 261 173.7 150.0 3,715 
Secured 0.617 1.000 261 0.647 1.000 3,130 
Has Performance Pricing 0.234 0.000 261 0.752 1.000 3,659 
Has a Line of Credit/Revolver 0.770 1.000 261 0.884 1.000 3,717 
        
Financial Covenants   Number of Financial Covenants 3.318 3.000 261 2.570 3.000 3,603 
Any Net Worth Covenants 0.728 1.000 261 0.452 0.000 3,603 
Income Escalator 0.384 0.000 190 0.743 1.000 3,603 
Conservatively Defined Income 0.352 0.000 261 0.575 1.000 3,603 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1995. We exclude financial and utility industries (sic 6000-6999 and sic 4000-4999). All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. 
Panel A Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Median Std P25 P75 
D(Escalator) 190 0.384 0.000 0.488 0.000 1.000 
D(ConsDef) 261 0.352 0.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 
Signed AA-KLW 238 0.003 -0.003 0.086 -0.042 0.041 
Signed AA-DD 235 0.049 0.040 0.069 -0.004 0.100 
|Neg AA-KLW| 238 0.029 0.003 0.046 0.000 0.042 
|Neg AA-DD| 235 0.006 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.004 
Signed SPI/AT 236 -0.007 0.000 0.027 -0.001 0.000 
|Neg SPI/AT| 261 0.008 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 
Affected 261 0.222 0.000 0.417 0.000 0.000 
Cov Intensity 261 3.318 3.000 1.777 2.000 4.000 
Maturity 261 3.257 3.000 2.122 1.822 4.964 
Loan/Assets 261 0.285 0.167 0.473 0.078 0.341 
Ppricing 261 0.234 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.000 
Revolver 261 0.770 1.000 0.422 1.000 1.000 
Spread 261 1.034 0.750 1.542 0.000 1.500 
Rating 261 12.568 12.881 2.373 10.799 14.724 
ROA 261 0.024 0.033 0.072 0.003 0.065 
Sales Growth 261 0.170 0.136 0.267 0.019 0.251 
BTM 261 0.757 0.599 0.640 0.376 0.942 
Stock Return 261 0.074 0.115 0.543 -0.278 0.401 
Firm Size 261 5.100 5.045 1.584 4.018 6.012 
Firm Age 261 2.293 2.079 0.858 1.792 2.944 
Firm Leverage 261 0.293 0.286 0.232 0.137 0.446 
Capx/Asset 261 0.096 0.057 0.122 0.030 0.103 
D(Issue Equity) 261 0.678 1.000 0.468 0.000 1.000 
Equity Volatility 261 -2.110 -2.106 0.457 -2.419 -1.814 
ROA Volatility 261 -4.889 -4.844 1.111 -5.631 -4.090 
IO 261 0.291 0.273 0.210 0.121 0.424 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics, Cont’d 
 
Panel B Correlation 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 
[1] D(Escalator) 1.00                           
[2] D(ConsDef) 0.04 1.00                          
[3] Signed AA-KLW -0.15 -0.10 1.00                         
[4] Signed AA-DD 0.15 -0.07 0.39 1.00                        
[5] |Neg AA-KLW| 0.14 0.06 -0.77 0.08 1.00                       
[6] |Neg AA-DD| -0.05 0.00 -0.17 -0.58 0.02 1.00                      
[7] Signed SPI/AT 0.13 -0.11 0.23 -0.03 -0.25 0.04 1.00                     
[8] |Neg SPI/AT| -0.11 0.12 -0.20 0.04 0.21 -0.05 -0.97 1.00                    
[9] Affected -0.24 0.13 -0.07 -0.13 0.00 0.13 -0.03 0.02 1.00                   
[10] Cov Intensity 0.20 0.34 -0.13 -0.13 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.01 1.00                  
[11] Maturity 0.19 0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.05 0.13 0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 1.00                 
[12] Loan/Assets 0.05 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.14 0.09 1.00                
[13] Ppricing 0.13 0.14 -0.15 0.00 0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.25 0.12 1.00               
[14]. Revolver -0.18 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.20 0.15 0.13 1.00              
[15] Spread 0.07 -0.12 0.13 0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.21 0.05 -0.09 -0.37 -0.29 1.00             
[16] Rating 0.00 -0.08 0.11 0.08 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.06 0.08 -0.14 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 0.17 1.00            
[17] ROA 0.12 0.07 0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 0.44 -0.41 -0.07 0.00 0.18 0.13 0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.48 1.00           
[18] Sales Growth 0.10 -0.17 0.03 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.10 -0.11 -0.06 -0.10 0.12 0.08 -0.02 -0.19 0.14 0.03 0.20 1.00          
[19] BTM -0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.19 -0.11 -0.24 0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.22 -0.27 1.00         
[20] Stock Return 0.17 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.14 -0.12 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 0.17 0.17 -0.05 0.00 -0.28 0.39 0.28 -0.48 1.00        
[21] Firm Size 0.15 0.18 -0.11 0.00 0.07 0.01 -0.19 0.19 0.06 -0.03 0.20 -0.19 0.34 -0.09 -0.20 -0.22 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 1.00       
[22] Firm Age -0.15 0.20 -0.17 -0.20 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.27 0.13 -0.14 -0.26 0.05 -0.18 0.05 0.08 0.35 1.00      
[23] Firm Leverage 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.30 -0.29 -0.04 0.09 -0.11 0.21 -0.05 1.00     
[24] Capx/Asset 0.08 -0.15 0.13 0.18 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.18 -0.11 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 -0.30 0.15 0.09 -0.01 0.40 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.33 0.03 1.00    
[25] D(Issue Equity) 0.08 -0.06 0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.27 -0.25 0.12 -0.07 -0.13 -0.16 0.19 1.00   
[26] Equity Volatility -0.04 -0.13 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.13 -0.05 -0.22 0.07 -0.17 0.00 0.15 0.37 -0.20 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.35 -0.19 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 1.00  
[27] ROA Volatility -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.36 0.37 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.02 0.15 0.22 -0.24 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 -0.20 -0.15 -0.12 -0.03 0.08 0.14 1.00 
[28] IO 0.11 0.14 -0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.13 -0.22 0.22 0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.29 0.02 -0.26 -0.24 0.16 0.11 -0.23 0.18 0.52 0.16 -0.12 0.00 0.11 -0.29 -0.09 
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Table 3 Loan Contract Modifications-Regression 
The sample consists of 261 randomly selected loan contracts from 1989 to 1994. Closeness to default is defined using the Merton distance-to-
default measure. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the logit regressions but are not reported. z-statistics are 
presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the state of incorporation level. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 D(Escalator) D(ConsDef)    
Afterlaw*Affected -1.289 -2.029 
 (-2.54)** (-4.23)*** Affected -1.469 1.152 
 (-4.55)*** (4.25)*** Cov Intensity 0.499 0.606 
 (6.71)*** (5.71)*** Maturity 0.112 0.020 
 (1.23) (0.21) Loan/Assets 0.054 0.034 
 (0.09) (0.08) Ppricing 0.404 -0.074 
 (0.96) (-0.21) Revolver -0.920 -0.404 
 (-2.72)*** (-0.59) Spread 0.113 0.070 
 (0.56) (0.41) Rating 0.083 -0.058 
 (0.70) (-0.83) ROA 3.198 3.629 
 (0.52) (0.95) Sales Growth 0.284 -1.019 
 (0.31) (-0.98) BTM -0.027 -0.174 
 (-0.06) (-0.44) Stock Return 0.665 0.136 
 (2.48)** (0.32) Firm Size 0.450 0.290 
 (2.14)** (1.50) Firm Age -0.528 0.430 
 (-2.63)*** (1.99)** Firm Leverage 1.291 0.361 
 (1.33) (0.71) Capx/Asset -0.857 0.604 
 (-0.59) (0.32) D(Issue Equity) -0.122 -0.375 
 (-0.31) (-1.48) Equity Volatility 0.682 0.237 
 (1.26) (0.69) ROA Volatility -0.140 0.274 
 (-0.82) (1.78)* IO 0.645 1.045 
 (0.86) (1.84)*    
Observations 190 261 
R-squared 0.291 0.269 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
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Table 4 Discretionary Accruals 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. Closeness to default is defined using the Merton distance-to-default measure. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the regressions but are not reported. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are 
clustered at the state of incorporation level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Signed DA-KLW Signed DA-DD |Neg DA-KLW| |Neg DA-DD| 
          
Afterlaw*Affected -0.044 -0.042 0.026 0.015 
 (-2.70)** (-5.89)*** (3.24)*** (5.81)*** 
Affected 0.003 -0.016 -0.011 0.001 
 (0.27) (-2.16)** (-2.57)** (0.91) 
ROA 0.093 -0.011 -0.085 -0.004 
 (0.79) (-0.30) (-1.21) (-0.67) 
Sales Growth -0.006 0.047 0.029 0.002 
 (-0.24) (2.10)** (1.26) (0.64) 
BTM 0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.52) (0.54) (-0.91) (-0.30) 
Stock Return -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 
 (-0.09) (-0.14) (-0.75) (0.65) 
Firm Size -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 (-0.79) (0.56) (1.02) (0.50) 
Firm Age -0.011 -0.009 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.82)* (-1.35) (0.00) (-0.09) 
Leverage 0.038 0.050 -0.014 -0.005 
 (1.59) (3.99)*** (-1.00) (-1.95)* 
Capx/Asset 0.076 0.072 -0.016 -0.023 
 (1.91)* (2.01)* (-1.16) (-5.51)*** 
D(Issue Equity) -0.004 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.48) (-0.02) (0.51) (-1.48) 
Equity Volatility -0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 
 (-0.38) (0.15) (0.80) (0.62) 
ROA Volatility 0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.001 
 (1.48) (1.11) (-1.46) (-2.71)** 
IO -0.002 0.037 0.005 -0.013 
 (-0.09) (1.91)* (0.41) (-5.26)*** 
  
Observations 238 235 238 235 
R-squared 0.127 0.266 0.162 0.211 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5 Negative Special Items 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. Closeness to default is defined using the Merton distance-to-default measure. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the regressions but are not reported. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses 
for Column 1 and 2. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and are clustered at state of incorporation level. 
  (1) (2) 
  
Signed 
SPI/AT 
|Neg 
SPI/AT| 
      
Afterlaw*Affected -0.010 0.009 
 (-2.37)** (2.29)** 
Affected 0.005 -0.005 
 (1.32) (-1.88)* 
ROA 0.149 -0.129 
 (1.82)* (-1.79)* 
Sales Growth -0.007 0.006 
 (-1.06) (1.12) 
BTM -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.46) (0.25) 
Stock Return -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.21) (0.38) 
Firm Size -0.003 0.003 
 (-2.74)** (3.20)*** 
Firm Age 0.001 0.000 
 (0.32) (0.15) 
Leverage 0.007 -0.006 
 (1.04) (-0.88) 
Capx/Asset 0.001 0.004 
 (0.07) (0.28) 
D(Issue Equity) 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.70) (-1.07) 
Equity Volatility -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.16) (0.42) 
ROA Volatility -0.007 0.007 
 (-5.24)*** (5.73)*** 
IO -0.030 0.028 
 (-3.75)*** (4.27)*** 
 
Observations 236 261 
R-squared 0.430 0.434 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
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Table 6 SFAS 106 Adoption 
The sample period is the first fiscal year after 15 December 1992, the date of implementation of SFAS 106. The table uses a cross-sectional sample 
of all Compustat firms with non-zero postretirement unrecognized transition obligations or postretirement accumulated benefit obligation in that 
year. Closeness to default is defined using the Merton distance-to-default measure. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are 
included in the regressions but are not reported. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the state of incorporation 
level. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 Ratio Pruto/AT 
      
Affected -0.052 0.055 
 (-3.44)*** (0.76) 
ROA -0.100 0.019 
 (-1.25) (0.34) 
Sales Growth 0.012 -0.010 
 (0.64) (-0.91) 
BTM 0.032 0.006 
 (4.22)*** (1.32) 
Stock Return 0.022 -0.036 
 (1.34) (-0.75) 
Firm Size -0.041 -0.062 
 (-7.51)*** (-0.93) 
Firm Age 0.022 -0.003 
 (3.28)*** (-0.23) 
Leverage 0.178 0.105 
 (3.46)*** (0.97) 
Capx/Asset -0.234 -0.066 
 (-1.57) (-0.33) 
D(Issue Equity) 0.050 0.036 
 (4.38)*** (0.94) 
Equity Volatility 0.048 -0.204 
 (2.83)*** (-0.88) 
ROA Volatility -0.021 0.025 
 (-1.96)* (0.92) 
 
Observations 1,186 1,186 
R-squared 0.448 0.013 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
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Table 7 Causality 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. Closeness to default is defined based on the Merton distance-to-default measure. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the regressions but are not reported. t-statistics (z-statistics) are presented beneath the coefficients 
within parentheses for Column 3-5 (Column 1-2). *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the state of incorporation level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 D(Escalator) D(ConsDef) Signed SPI/AT Signed DA-KLW Signed DA-DD 
      
Afterlaw(t=-1)*Affected -0.120 0.868 -0.009 -0.014 -0.029 
 (-0.16) (1.55) (-1.43) (-0.92) (-1.41) Afterlaw(t=0)*Affected 0.896 -0.054 -0.002 0.052 0.001 
 (0.97) (-0.09) (-0.29) (1.47) (0.05) Afterlaw(t=1)*Affected -1.635 -3.244 -0.024 -0.024 -0.087 
 (-1.99)** (-6.51)*** (-3.15)*** (-0.79) (-4.01)*** Afterlaw(t>=2)*Affected -0.671 -0.845 -0.007 -0.049 -0.041 
 (-0.93) (-1.07) (-0.82) (-2.09)** (-3.70)*** Affected -1.690 0.906 0.008 -0.005 -0.007 
 (-4.10)*** (2.48)** (1.24) (-0.23) (-0.36) ROA 3.251 4.199 0.151 0.104 -0.004 
 (0.54) (1.24) (1.72) (0.83) (-0.11) Sales Growth 0.298 -1.024 -0.007 -0.007 0.050 
 (0.33) (-0.94) (-0.86) (-0.24) (2.00)* BTM -0.098 -0.192 -0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.22) (-0.47) (-0.69) (0.33) (0.34) Stock Return 0.650 0.186 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
 (2.30)** (0.44) (-0.13) (-0.39) (-0.11) Firm Size 0.472 0.301 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 
 (2.23)** (1.53) (-2.63)** (-0.54) (0.65) Firm Age -0.525 0.385 0.001 -0.010 -0.007 
 (-2.52)** (1.77)* (0.40) (-1.74)* (-1.10) Firm Leverage 1.287 0.462 0.008 0.036 0.052 
 (1.26) (0.99) (1.06) (1.41) (3.91)*** Capx/Asset -0.922 0.470 -0.000 0.078 0.068 
 (-0.59) (0.23) (-0.01) (2.06)* (1.87)* D(Issue Equity) -0.186 -0.413 0.002 -0.004 0.001 
 (-0.44) (-1.59) (0.60) (-0.49) (0.11) Equity Volatility 0.747 0.277 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (1.31) (0.81) (-0.19) (-0.06) (0.22) ROA Volatility -0.151 0.299 -0.007 0.005 0.005 
 (-0.90) (2.05)** (-4.91)*** (1.33) (1.14) IO 0.516 1.059 -0.032 -0.008 0.030 
 (0.66) (1.67)* (-4.03)*** (-0.31) (1.42)       
Observations 188 261 236 238 235 
R-squared 0.294 0.280 0.439 0.136 0.272 
Loan-Level Controls Yes Yes No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 Business Cycle Variations across Geographic Regions and Industries 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. Closeness to default is defined based on the Merton distance-to-default measures. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the regressions but are not reported. Location fixed effects are for the state in which the firm’s 
headquarters are located. t-statistics (z-statistics) are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses for Column 3-5 (Column 1-2). *, ** and 
*** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the state of 
incorporation level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 D(Escalator) D(ConsDef) Signed SPI/AT Signed DA-KLW Signed DA-DD 
            
Afterlaw*Affected -3.139 -1.875 -0.012 -0.028 -0.040 
 (-3.78)*** (-2.84)*** (-3.44)*** (-1.46) (-2.69)** 
Affected -4.034 0.924 0.008 -0.000 -0.017 
 (-2.46)** (1.95)* (1.84)* (-0.03) (-2.29)** 
ROA 4.323 5.291 0.161 0.092 0.057 
 (0.44) (1.22) (1.95)* (0.73) (1.23) 
Sales Growth 0.611 -2.557 -0.005 0.010 0.055 
 (0.34) (-3.28)*** (-0.87) (0.28) (2.25)** 
BTM 0.669 -0.272 -0.002 0.012 0.004 
 (0.51) (-0.60) (-0.56) (2.01)* (0.54) 
Stock Return 1.375 0.456 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.87) (1.31) (-0.42) (-0.32) (0.10) 
Firm Size 0.698 0.380 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 
 (1.84)* (1.61) (-3.82)*** (-0.87) (0.63) 
Firm Age -1.437 0.413 0.002 -0.011 -0.009 
 (-2.14)** (1.24) (0.60) (-1.85)* (-1.01) 
Firm Leverage 2.108 1.195 0.017 0.060 0.061 
 (1.30) (1.86)* (2.73)** (3.55)*** (2.87)*** 
Capx/Asset 8.429 1.199 0.000 0.058 0.088 
 (2.29)** (0.42) (0.01) (1.97)* (3.10)*** 
D(Issue Equity) 0.250 0.090 0.002 -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.44) (-0.95) (-0.30) 
Equity Volatility 2.580 1.157 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 
 (2.30)** (2.31)** (-0.39) (-1.32) (-0.06) 
ROA Volatility -0.063 0.422 -0.007 0.004 0.008 
 (-0.15) (2.52)** (-5.25)*** (1.03) (1.50) 
IO 2.649 1.764 -0.022 -0.001 0.025 
 (0.87) (2.64)*** (-2.41)** (-0.04) (1.52) 
  
Observations 174 230 236 238 235 
R-squared 0.494 0.415 0.541 0.232 0.398 
Loan-Level Controls 
Location FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9 Alternative Measure of Near Insolvency 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. Closeness to default is defined based on the Altman Z-Score. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Intercept terms are included in the regressions but are not reported. t-statistics (z-statistics) are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses 
for Column 3-5 (Column 1-2).  *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the state of incorporation level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 D(Escalator) D(ConsDef) Signed SPI/AT Signed DA-KLW Signed DA-DD 
            
Afterlaw*Affected(Zscore) -0.623 -1.923 -0.016 -0.034 -0.025 
 (-1.68)* (-3.09)*** (-3.76)*** (-1.82)* (-3.34)*** 
Affected(Zscore) -0.425 0.883 0.004 0.016 0.014 
 (-0.81) (2.98)*** (1.26) (1.72) (2.24)** 
ROA 3.337 4.306 0.154 0.104 0.015 
 (0.62) (1.15) (1.90)* (0.84) (0.35) 
Sales Growth 0.002 -1.119 -0.009 -0.013 0.041 
 (0.00) (-1.08) (-1.28) (-0.44) (2.11)** 
BTM 0.042 -0.097 -0.001 0.005 0.003 
 (0.12) (-0.26) (-0.29) (0.76) (0.57) 
Stock Return 0.619 0.079 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (2.42)** (0.18) (-0.05) (0.13) (0.07) 
Firm Size 0.404 0.301 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 
 (1.85)* (1.74)* (-2.75)** (-0.74) (0.29) 
Firm Age -0.494 0.315 0.000 -0.013 -0.009 
 (-2.91)*** (1.67)* (0.01) (-1.80)* (-1.35) 
Firm Leverage 1.216 0.544 0.009 0.037 0.048 
 (1.39) (1.06) (1.27) (1.40) (3.91)*** 
Capx/Asset 0.137 -0.396 -0.005 0.069 0.076 
 (0.09) (-0.19) (-0.24) (1.61) (2.19)** 
D(Issue Equity) 0.048 -0.382 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.14) (-1.49) (0.62) (-0.41) (-0.18) 
Equity Volatility 0.312 0.406 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.66) (1.33) (0.06) (-0.46) (-0.25) 
ROA Volatility -0.050 0.299 -0.007 0.005 0.006 
 (-0.37) (1.82)* (-5.04)*** (1.56) (1.32) 
IO 0.617 1.167 -0.029 -0.001 0.039 
 (1.06) (2.00)** (-3.72)*** (-0.06) (2.44)** 
   
Observations 188 261 236 238 235 
R-squared 
Loan-Level Controls 
0.241 
Yes 
0.263 
Yes 
0.440 
No 
0.124 
No 
0.250 
No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
